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| Ken Abramowitz of SaveTheWest at the Republican Jewish Coalition |
Mr. Abramowitz, founder and President of Save The West, begins by describing what he calls the “two elephants in the Middle East room”—the Qatar–Turkey–Muslim Brotherhood bloc representing Sunni Islamist power, and the Iranian regime leading the Shiite axis. He characterizes both as “death cults” that gain influence through intimidation and violence. These regimes, he warns, are not passive observers. They actively maneuver to shape U.S. foreign policy, often to the detriment of American allies.
From his perspective, Qatar and Turkey have successfully pressured the White House to restrain Israel, particularly in its campaign to dismantle Hamas. Washington’s desire to manage diplomacy, hostage negotiations, and global perception creates what Abramowitz sees as an unnecessary straightjacket around Israeli action.
This is where his larger point emerges. America possesses overwhelming military capability, but frequently lacks the political will to use it decisively. Israel, in contrast, is a small nation surrounded by existential threats; hesitation is a luxury it cannot afford. As Abramowitz puts it, Israel “has the arms and the will,” a combination no other Western ally possesses.
This fusion of capability and resolve makes Israel, in his view, a kind of extension of American power—the actor that will do what Washington cannot or will not. For Abramowitz, this is not a criticism of the United States as much as a recognition of geopolitical reality. Democracies with global commitments tend to avoid prolonged or high-risk military actions. Israel, by virtue of its geography and history, makes decisions through a different lens: survival.
He applies this logic directly to Hamas and Iran. Abramowitz argues that Hamas cannot be appeased or reformed and that attempts at negotiation inevitably fail because violent ideological movements only stop when they are forcibly stopped. He draws comparisons to Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, al-Qaeda, and ISIS—entities ultimately defeated not by diplomacy but by sustained military force.
The same logic, he says, applies to Iran’s nuclear program. While the United States has the technical ability to eliminate Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, it lacks the political will to risk escalation. Israel, he insists, has both—because it must. The difference between “should” and “must,” he suggests, is the gap between American caution and Israeli necessity.
Abramowitz also acknowledges a tension inside U.S.–Israeli cooperation: the prioritization of hostage recovery in Gaza. He says President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu made a conscious choice to allow Qatar and Turkey to mediate in order to secure the release of 20 living hostages. That humanitarian decision, he argues, came with a strategic cost—slowing Israel’s military momentum. Yet he views this as a calculated tradeoff rather than a strategic blunder.
Ultimately, Abramowitz’s warning is less about today’s headlines and more about tomorrow’s stakes. The Middle East is not a region where ideological movements retire peacefully. He believes the U.S. will eventually come to the same conclusion he has: force, not negotiation, will determine the future of Hamas and Iran. When that moment arrives, he argues, Israel will be the nation carrying out actions that align with American interests—even if Washington cannot say so openly.
Whether one agrees with Abramowitz or not, his message is clear: capability is not enough. In the Middle East, the will to act is the ultimate currency of survival—and he believes Israel is the only nation prepared to spend it.
